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HUMAN-INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
GUNTER SCHRAMM*

INTRODUCTION
More and more in the developing world, water resource development and management is conceived in terms of broad socialeconomic-political objectives, rather than in the narrower context of
isolated single or multiple purpose projects that are designed to provide no more than specific water services for specific purposes. Illustrative of this wider perspective are the overall objectives of Mexico's
National Water Plan, which were defined as:I
Improvement in the distribution of income;
Generation of permanent and productive employment;
Increase in the income of small-scale farmers;
Reduction in the economic dependence on outside countries;
Achievement of the highest possible rate of growth that is compatible with economic and social stability; and
(6) Preservation of environmental quality.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

These broadened water resource perspectives, as important instruments of socio-economic development, have brought about an
acceleration of investments and development activities in the water
sector which were and are being supported by many of the international and bi-lateral aid and lending institutions such as the World
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, AID and others.2
Within the context of these objectives, individual programs or
projects are conceived, designed and evaluated on the basis of feasibility criteria such as benefit-cost ratios or target levels of internal
rates of return, or at least some form of cost-effectiveness analysis. In
addition, the long standing concerns with issues of un- and underemployment, scarcity of foreign exchange and other limited input
*University of Michigan. The author wants to thank Santiago 1. Friedmann for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Secretaria De Recursos Hidraulicos, Subsecretaria De Planeacion, Plan Nacional

Hidraulico 1975 Mexico, vol. 1,at 37.

2. Between 1947 and 1972, for example, the World Bank had lent a total of some $22.1
billion, of which roughly half was for water resources projects. From P. Z. Kirpich, Some
World Bank Experiences in Water Resource Planning, Int'l Symposium on Water Planning:
Papers, vol. II, Mexico, Nov., 1972.
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factors have led to the development of evaluation criteria and
methodologies that allow the analyst to shadow price these elements.'
In recent years, increasing efforts have been directed at the development of policies to close the socio-economic gap between the
modem, growing and the stagnant, traditional sectors of many of the
developing countries. This problem afflicts a majority of these
nations.4 Paralleling these new objectives, the techniques of program
and project evaluations have been broadened to take account of this
multiplicity of goals, particularly the differential impact of specific
programs and projects on economically disadvantaged target populations.5
However, despite the many efforts that have been directed towards the development, design and application of sophisticated
evaluation criteria and methodologies, practical results of completed
projects have frequently been rather disappointing, as can be seen
from a large and growing body of critical literature.6
It is the contention of this paper that a major, and perhaps the
major contributing factor to this discrepancy between expectations
and results has been the human, and human-institutional elements.
By and large, program and project evaluations proceed on the
assumption that the availability of financial resources, whether internal or external, represents the major constraint towards more
rapid development, subject to the usual economic project feasibility
criteria. Closer observations, however, indicate that in many cases the
financial constraints are less important, and less binding, than the
3. See, e.g., I. Little & J. Mirrless, Project Appraisal and Planning For the Developing
Countries (1974); P. Dasgupta, A. Sen, S. Marglin, Guidelines For Project Evaluation, New
York (1972); D. Lal, Wells and Welfare (1972); F. Seton, Shadow Wages in the Chilean
Economy (1972).
4. For a summary review of this problem in Mexico, see Escamilla, Schramm & Gonzalez,
Water As A Social Solvent? Alternative Development Strategies For Mexico's Subsistence
Agricultural Sector, Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Water Resources, New
Delhi, vol. 11, at 571-588 (Dec. 1975).
S. See, e.g., C. Howe, Benefit-Cost Analysis For Water System Planning (1971);
Schramm, Accounting For Non-Economic Goals In Benefit-Cost Analysis J. of Environ.

Management, I, 2 (1973); L. Squire & H. van der Tak, Economic Analysis of Projects
(1975).
6. D. Barkin & T. King, Regional Economic Development, The River Basin Approach In
Mexico (1970); P. Crosson, Agricultural Development and Productivity (1970); P. Kirpich,
Leadership Constraint in Project Preparation, Engineering Issues ASCE (Oct. 1976); R.
Manning & 0. Ela, An Economic Evaluation of Irrigation Rehabilitation Projects in Mexico,
U.N. Doc. IBRD/EC-180 (Sept., 1971); M. Nelson, The Development of Tropical Lands
(1973); W. Paddock & E. Paddock, We Don't Know How (1973); T. Poleman, The Papaloapan Project, Agricultural Development In the Mexican Tropics (1964); A. Waterston,
Development Planning, Lessons of Experience, ch. 9 (1965).
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human related ones.7 Moreover, while financial constraints can frequently be overcome by negotiations, re-allocation of resources, or
additional borrowings, the constraints related to human factors must
generally be defined as structural problems which will yield little in
the short run and only very slowly and reluctantly in the long run.
Such human constraints exist on the side of the beneficiaries or
recipients of programs and projects, as well as on the side of the
executors or providers of them. On the beneficiaries' side, they
usually arise because of the inability or unwillingness of the recipients to behave as predicted or projected by the planner. On the
institutional side, a whole host of factors usually combine to bring
about unforeseen and unpredicted inefficiencies. Some of the more
prominent ones are the lack of communications and coordination
between different agencies; the frequently existing institutional rivalries; the high turnover rates of professionals employed in government
agencies and, most importantly, the generally insufficient level of
professional training for agency personnel.
The following discussion will focus on several of these constraint
factors, and, by using some examples from recent experience in
water planning in Mexico, indicate some of the major problems confronting a planning authority's attempt to use water resource
developments as a lever to bring about more rapid socio-economic
change and growth.
THE ROLE OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING
In a recent book, two old hands at the game caustically attacked
the international aid efforts towards the developing nations by claiming "We don't know how."' Perhaps this statement should be
adapted to read "They don't know how," in order to explain the
many failures and disappointments that have been encountered.
Today few people remember that systematic international aid
efforts, including the formation of such prominent institutions as the
World Bank, were begun after World War II in order to help a war
devastated Europe, and later Japan. What most people do remember,
however, is that these initial efforts of massive international transfers
of resources were tremendously successful. It took a decade, or less,
7. For corrobarative evidence see the data in the study by Santiago Friedmann and
Larissa Lomnitz who show that it would require only about 1/3 of the average 1950 to
1965 annual rate of GNP growth in Latin America to raise, within 5 years, the per capita
income of the lowest quintile of the population to $250, or the equivalent of that of the
lowest quintil in Europe in 1960. Friedmann & Lomnitz, Development of Latin America:
Can the Haves Help? in Intern'l Technical Cooperation Water Rev. (Spring, 1974).
8. Paddock and Paddock,,supra note 6.
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and both Europe and Japan were well on their way again. On the
other hand, if one looks at the "developing" nations, several decades
of .sustained efforts, both international and internal, have not
brought forth anything equally successful, even though many of
these nations, Argentina, Indonesia, Iran, Venezuela and others, have
at their disposal natural resource endowments on a per capita basis
that far surpass those of Western Europe or Japan. Why, then, were
these efforts so much less effective?
It appears that the fundamental difference between these two
groups of countries was, and still is, that the latter had a disciplined
labor force which had been exposed for a number of successive generations to the exactitudes and special demands of a highly interdependent, industrialized society. In these societies the educational
system not only imparts knowledge, but it trains people to accept a
mode of behavior and work discipline without which such societies,
with their high degree of internal interdependencies, cannot function
efficiently ."
One of the consequences of the lack of a reliable, trained human
infrastructure in the developing world is that even those organizational units that are internally efficient, whether they are industrial
plants, irrigation districts, department stores or government departments, cannot function well because of the unreliability of the outside systems on whose services they depend. Unreliable mail
services, 1 0 telephone networks that break down frequently, spare
parts that do not arrive, electric power supplies that are interrupted
and idle costly machinery and manpower are all factors which
impinge on the efficiency and effectiveness of even the most internally efficient organization.
Mexico, whose economic growth performance in the postwar
period has made it one of the most successful of the developing
nations,1 provides a good example. In the 1970 Census Year, only
13.4% of the economically active population had more than six years
of primary schooling; another 29.3% had attended school for 4-6
years, while of the remaining 57.1%, only 30% had attended school
for 1-3 years. Given the low quality of schooling at this level, Mexi9. For a similar view see 1. Adelman and C. Morris, Society, Politics, and Economic
Development (1967 & 1971).
10. In Mexico, for example, airmail letters sent to or from central destinations such as
Mexico City may arrive within 3-5 days; however, perhaps 50% of such mail will require as
many as 2-6 weeks; if the piece mailed is heavier than a few ounces the delays in delivery of
up to 3 months are not uncommon, even if the material is sent by airmail special delivery, or
registered mail, or both. [Based on the author's experience.]
11. Between 1950 and 1972, the average annual rate of growth in constant prices was
6.52%. 11 Banco De Mexico, Indicadores Economicos, 12 (Nov., 1974).
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can scholars define the latter 57.1% as functionally illiterate, which
means that close to 60% of the economically active population in the
entire country was functionally illiterate. I2
By comparison, in the industrialized nations, functional illiteracy
amounts to a few percent, while between 16%, in Austria, to 44%, in
the U.S.A.,1 of the relevant age groups have access to post-secondary
education. 3
If educational achievement in Mexico is analyzed at the sectoral
level, it is found that in 1970 even in government employment 25.3%
were functionally illiterate; in industry the percentage rises to 38.5%,

while in agriculture, which accounted for 40% of the total economically active population, the percentage was an overwhelming

82.7%.1

4

Given such a low educational base, it is clear that economic performance and economic growth are severely handicapped in comparison to more advanced nations. One of the major consequences of
this situation is that developing countries generally face serious manpower shortages at the managerial and highly skilled technical
levels.' I In Mexico, for example, salary levels for highly-skilled professionals in almost all fields compare quite favorably with rates paid
for similar jobs in high wage countries such as Canada and the United
States.1 6 On the other side, there exists a huge and still growing
12. This was the conclusion of V. Urquidi; the data quoted were taken from table 5 of
his article Empleo y Explosion Demografica, Demografia Y Economia, 23 table 5 (1974).
13. OECD Observer No. 80 (March-April, 1976), at 26.
14. The importance of this problem has not been overlooked by Mexican Authorities,
and strenuous efforts are made to increase effective school coverage. For a detailed statistical report see Rodriguez & Mufioz B. La Alfabetizacion Y La Ensenanza Primeria en
Mexico 1974-75, Revista del Centro De Estudios Educativos, vol. 6, no. 1, at 157-160
(1976).
15. This lack of managerial capacity was identified as the most serious roadblock to
economic development in Argentina. See Adelman, A Linear ProgrammingModel of Educational Planning: A Case study of Argentina, in The Theory and Design of Economic Development (I. Adelman & E. Thombecke, eds, 1966). For similar conclusions, see P. Kirpich,
supra note 6, at 418. Kirpich states:
Long-range, rather grandiose plans do exist in many countries but there is a
persistent lack of well-prepared projects.
And as one of the basic reasons for this shortcoming he concludes at 420 that,
While the availability of professionals from various disciplines . . . is essential,
this is insufficient. In addition, there must be generalists who can do at least
two things: (1) coordinate the efforts of the separate disciplines and (2) provide linkages with outside agencies and with the local people. Such generalists
are unfortunately rare, not only in developing nations but in the developed
ones as well.
16. In 1975, for example, economists at the M.A. level, with a few short years of work
experience, obtained salaries of between $12-20,000 per year. See also the regular salary
survey of the American Chamber of Commerce, Mexico City, Survey of Wages, Salaries and
Benefits Among Manufacturing and Service Companies (annual).
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surplus of poorly or totally uneducated, non-functional individuals
whose actual and potential marginal physical product is zero, or close
to zero.1 This shortage of skilled manpower on the one side, and
the surplus of hard-to-train unskilled manpower on the other, is at
the heart of what this study defines as the human-institutional problem. It is instructive to trace the consequences of this unbalanced
.polarity of human endowments on the internal functioning of institutions as well as on the implementations of well intentioned
present programs and projects.
EFFECTS OF SKILL SHORTAGES ON INSTITUTIONS
In Mexico, the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (Secretaria De
Recursos Hidraulicos) is one of the most prestigious and powerful
federal government organizations. In 1975, its budget amounted to
the equivalent of $662.4 million U.S. dollars and its total employment to 59,500 persons. Its 1975 investments were estimated to
account for 15% of the total public investments.1 8 Of the 59,500
employees 5% had not received any education at all; 47% had only
some primary education, 11% had secondary and 5% had some additional pre-university or vocational education. Of the remaining 32%,
4% were classified as technicians, 12% as administrators and the
remaining 15%, or 8,949 persons, as professionals. As the National
Water Plan claims, the number of professionals would have to grow
by 11% per year for the next 6 to 8 years to keep up with projected
manpower requirements. However, as the Plan also points out, the
present output of the higher educational system is-unable to supply
these needs, which compete with the requirements of other sectors
of the rapidly growing economy. One' of the major consequences of
skilled manpower shortages is a very high turnover of professional
personnel within the organization. A detailed study found that at the
middle technical level between 45% and 60% of the members of the
various professional groups had held their specific position for less
than three years and only 10-15% had been on their job for as long as
6 to 9 years.
As the study concludes:
The personnel which leaves the services of the SRH is hired in part
by private consultants who in turn sell their technical services to
17. For Mexico, un- and underemployment rates in 1970 were estimated at 45% of EAP;
projections made for 1980 indicated a probable rate of 56%. These percentages were based
on a definition of underemployment in terms of earnings rather than time worked. From
Escamilla, Schramm and Gonzalez, supra note 4, table 5.
18. Secretaria De Recursos Iidraulicos, supra note 1, vol. 3, at 81 and table 153.
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SRH. At the same time, the difficulty to hire and retain such personnel forces the Secretariat frequently to make use of these consulting services. It is clear that under such conditions of rapid staff
turn-over, optimum professional competency and performance will
rarely be achieved. 1 9
EFFECTS OF SKILL SHORTAGES ON DEVELOPMENT GOALS
As we have seen, water resource developments, and particularly
irrigation and/or drainage projects, 2 0 are used in many countries as
major tools for bringing about economic change and development in
the countryside. This is particularly true in Mexico, where close to
80% of the total SRH budget has traditionally been spent on irrigated agriculture.
While the technical manpower shortages often led to delays and
cost overruns in project design, construction and implementation,
more serious problems are encountered in bringing the productivity
of the irrigated land up to predicted levels. This difficulty is frequently the consequence of a lack of sufficient supporting services.2I
Such supporting services include availability and timeliness of
short and long term credit; and of fertilizer, seeds, and insecticides;
accessibility to markets and marketing facilities; and the availability
of effective agricultural research and extension services. All of these
ancillary services, which are needed in addition to the successful
completion and operation of the hydraulic works, depend on the
availability and functioning of relatively complex human-operated
delivery services. How important they are can be seen from a recent
study which showed that the expected differences in yields per hectare resulting from the addition of superior management inputs
would increase the expected internal rate of return of new irrigation
projects from less than 8 to over 21 %.2 2
The importance of these supporting services has been recognized.
As a result, most, if not all of the larger agricultural development
projects in Mexico, as in many other countries, now make specific
19. Id. at 91.
20. For a discussion of the large potential for agricultural drainage projects in the tropical lowlands of Middle and South America see Kirpich, Development of Lowland Tropical
Flood Plains in Latin America, paper prepared for presentation at the United Nations World
Water Conference, Buenos Aires (March 1977).
21. For some impressive case studies, see Barkin and King, Manning and Ela, and Nelson's discussion of the Chontalpa project, supra note 6.
22. Schramm, Macro Versus Micro Considerationsin IrrigationPlanning,paper presented
at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Western Regional Science Association, Tucson, Arizona
(Feb. 25-27, 1977).
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provisions for the supply of them. Typical of these comprehensive
project packages is the Papaloapan Rural Development Project,
which includes provisions and budgets for irrigation facilities, extension services, experimental farms, feeder roads, marketing facilities,
incremental working capital, technical services, water sewerage, electricity, medical centers, schools and workshops, and community
centers. 3
It is conceivable that all of these services will be delivered and will
work and function as predicted, particularly if these new projects are
financially well endowed so that they can outbid other competitors
for the scarce professional input factors required. However, the problem in a macro-sense is precisely that these input factors are scarce
and that they have many alternative employment opportunities.
What this means is that the new projects, which have yet to be built,
receive the scarce services that could not be supplied to projects or
operations that are already in existence, and that would not require
the expensive infrastructure investment of the new projects.
Hence, ceteris paribus, the marginal productivity of such a scarce
input factor is much higher in an already existing project than in a
new one. From an efficiency point of view (albeit not necessarily an
equity point of view), therefore, its use in new projects is inferior to
its use in projects which require less additional investment and other
resources to match its own productive contribution.
An analysis of Mexico's extension services can illustrate this point.
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS OF MEXICO'S
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICE
One of the serious problems confronting Mexico's agricultural
development policies is the lack of an effective extension service. In
1974, there were 2,851 extensionists active in the field, covering
some 2.8 million hectares.2 I Analyzing the trends of past years as
shown in the Bassoco study, as well as the extension service manpower requirements as listed in the Papaloapan Rural Development
manpower requirements are one
Program, 2 I the average professional
26
hectares.
700
per
specialist
23. For a discussion of the project, see Lamadrid, Integrated Rural Development Project
for the Papaloapan Basin in Mexico, Proceedings of the Second World Congress on Water

Resources New Delhi (Dec. 1975), vol. 2, at 519-527.
24. Bassoco de Gomez Tagle, L. M., Analisis de la Contribucion de los Factores e Insumos de la Produccion a! Credimiento del Sector Agricola de 1970 a 1974, Nota Tecnica
No. 5, Comision Coordinadora del Sector Agropecuario (COCOSA), Mexico (Jan., 1975).

25. See supra note 19.
26. This relatively high density is mainly a function of the very small landholdings of the
farmers requiring extension services and advice.
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This means that in 1974, instead of the actual 2,851 extension
specialists in the field, some 18,800 were required, assuming that
some 2.1 million of the 15.3 million hectares under cultivation were
sufficiently efficiently operated so as not to require special services.
Figure 127 presents a projection of extension manpower requirements and potential availabilities for the 1974 to 2000 period, given
the projected increase in both temporal and irrigated agricultural
land. This projection is based on the quite optimistic assumptions
that: the output of suitable extension agents would increase at an
annual rate of ten percent b9er year from 1974 until about 1995; that
about two-thirds of these graduates would be available for extension
services;2 8 and that the annual attrition or retirement rate would be
no more than 5%.29
A further, implicit assumption built into the projection is that
availability of extension agents produce instant agricultural yield
improvements. However, assumption of a zero gestation period is
naive. It is well known that the more traditional, small-scale holders
who generally represent the target population of current rural development programs frequently require several years of locally demonstrated success before a significant number of them can be persuaded
to adopt more effective production methods. While the reasons for
these slow adoption rates are complex, risk aversion factors, communication difficulties with, and need to trust in extension agents,
and a well entrenched distrust of governmental authorities in general
all seem to be contributing factors. 3" Furthermore, as one observer
has pointed out: 3'
Policymakers should be aware that, even in the best of circumstances, the staff recruited to carry out the program will, at the
27. For source, see supra note 1, vol. 2, ch. 5. For assumptions about the maximum
supply potential see text. Similar point estimates axe contained in supra note 1, vol. 3, at 88.
28. This would be a rather high rate. In 1974, of about 9,000 professional agronomists or
agricultural engineers in the country, only 3,000 had actually joined one of the extension
services; most of the others were working for central government offices, banks or private
industry, and these institutions in turn were unable to attract and hold capable professionals. See, e.g., S. Williams & J. Miller, Credit Systems For Small-Scale Farmers, 40 Bureau
of Business Research, Univ. of Texas (1973).
29. How optimistic this assumption is can be seen from the previous discussion of professional manpower turnover within the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. See also note 34
infra.
30. See, e.g., P. Coombs & A. Manzor, Attacking Rural Poverty: How Nonformal Education Can Help, 23 (1974); I. Fernandez, Los Problemas De La Organization Campesina

(1975); see also footnote 31.
31. Malone, Improving Management in Agricultural Development, in Science, Technology and Development, Vol. III, Agriculture, U.S. papers prepared for the U.N. Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas
(1962).
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FIGURE 1
EXTENSION SERVICE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND
PROJECTED MAXIMUM SUPPLY, MEXICO, 1974-2000.
No. of
Extensionists
35,000 -

30,000 -

25,000 -

20,000 18,800

15,000
e&secko l

12,100

10,000

5,900
5,000
2,851

0 1 I
1974 75

!
80

85

90

95

2000
Year

October 19761

HUMAN-INSTITUTIONAL

FACTORS

beginning, be unskilled in many aspects of their job. It could not be
otherwise; skill comes with experience-the need for thorough training must be emphasized, although training never substitutes for the

learning that comes from working on the job with an open mind.
In the Puebla project in Central Mexico, which is widely hailed as
one of the most successful yield-improvement programs for small
scale landholders, it took three years until some 6% of the farmers
could be persuaded to follow up the Plan's recommendation, and as
much as seven years until the maximum participation rate of some
17% was reached. 3 2
Even with these optimistic assumptions about the potential
growth in the pool of extension specialists and their effectiveness, it
can be seen from Figure 1 that the supply will not catch up with
requirements until about the year 2000, or 25 years into the
future. 3 By that time, full coverage of the expanded agricultural
production regions would require some 33,700 professionals, or
almost 12 times as many as were available in 1974.
Four conclusions can be drawn from this analysis:
A. The unsatisfied requirements for extension agents will be
greater than the available professional manpower supply for at least a
generation to come, even under the most favorable circumstances;
B. Areas that are remote or face other unfavorable living conditions will have difficulties in attracting and holding capable extensionists unless the government
is prepared to pay premium wages or
3
offer other inducements;

5

32. Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo, The Puebla Project: Seven
Years of Experience 1967-1973, El Batan, Mexico (1974). For a discussion and evaluation
of the project see also P. Coombs, and A. Manzoor, supra note 28, at 105-108 (1974).
33. This projection also assumes, of course, that the government would be willing and
able to finance the necessary expansion of the agricultural schools and would be willing to
provide the required fellowships to attract an increasing number of students into the field,
and in addition have the necessary resources to finance the huge expansion of the extension
service coverage.
34. It should be noted, however, that this projection is based on the somewhat simplistic
assumption that the density of extensive service coverage would have to remain constant in
all regions. This, hopefully, would not be the case given that gradual adaptation to modern
practices by farmers would become a self-perpetuating process after a number of years.
35. That this is a serious problem can be seen from Kirpich, supra note 19, para. 4.8. As
he states with respect to the implementation of proposed pilot projects in Colombia and
Ecuador, "Given the current reluctance in many countries for senior specialists to work in
the field, the basic team should be recruited from recent graduates who because of their age
would have an incentive to make their pilot project succeed." As a recent, unpublished
review report of a major rural-agricultural Latin American development program summarized the extension service staffing problem:
The real problem is a qualitative one. This has to do, on the one hand, with
the large proportion of recently graduated technicians, their lack of experience
and the nature of their technical training, and on the other hand with their
preparation and motivation for dealing effectively with small farmers... An-
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C. Professional turnover rates will be high, reducing the effectiveness of the services provided, since the latter depend to a significant
degree on familiarity and mutual trust between agents and the people
of the communities served;
D. Allocation of extensionists to one locale or project will mean
that another region or project will have to do without such service.
Their opportunity costs cannot simply be measured by their wage
rate, which is the present procedure in project evaluations, but must
be measured by the full foregone net value of their services in any
other potential location that could utilize their services.
It is obvious that the final conclusion is relevant not only for
measuring the true costs of extension services, but is equally relevant
for the analysis of the opportunity costs of other scarce factors,
whether these factors are human, such as engineers, construction
foremen, planners, marketing specialists; or technical, such as tractors, fertilizers, improved seeds; or financial, such as foreign exchange.
As was pointed out in the introduction to this paper, more recent
evaluation techniques are now designed to take full account of the
opportunity costs of labor. 3 6 However, attention has been centered
on the limited opportunity cost, or shadow wage, of low skilled, unand underemployed individuals. But any development program or
project that promises to employ such people requires at the same
time other scarce input factors, of which the professionals are generally in shortest supply. Manuals for program and project analyses,
therefore, should be expanded to provide a full accounting of the
physical requirements of those factors, and their full opportunity
costs reflecting their net marginal productivity in alternative employment. These opportunity costs, which frequently will be substantially higher than the wages that have to be paid to them, should be
charged in full against the project in order to evaluate its true contribution to development and growth.
In order to undertake such an accounting it would be necessary to
have some basic information about the real opportunity costs of high
skill labor. This information could, however, be systematically collected by a central manpower planning and evaluation unit and made
available to project planners.
other problem is the high rate of staff turnover... the aggregate number of
field resignations was... 35% of authorized staffing in one year. The main
cause appears to be the rapid expansions in demand from many public agencies who offered more attractive salaries.
36. See supra notes 3 and 5.
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SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What the preceding discussion shows is that traditional approaches
to water resources planning are deficient because they generally fail
to take explicit account of the direct and indirect requirements for,
and potential availabilities of skilled manpower inputs. But these are
the inputs whose quality and timely availability largely account for
the success or failure of any given undertaking. They are also the
inputs that, in most developing nations, are in shortest supply, have
the highest opportunity costs, and are most difficult to either replace
or augment when needed.
The importance of these human inputs has been recognized by
many governments. Consequently, in recent years most water resources projects contain detailed provisions for the financing of the
estimated professional manpower requirements, whether they are for
agricultural extension services, experimental field stations, supply of
credit facilities or other project related purposes. However, while
these manpower needs are elaborated and the required financial resources for their employment provided as parts of the overall program or project packages, usually no attempt is made to ascertain
whether the required professionals and technicians will be available
when needed.
This problem is aggravated by the jurisdictional division of responsibilities between various government departments whose coordination and cooperation generally is far from perfect. While the
immediate responsibility for a water resources project might lie fully
within one agency, in the case of Mexico, the Ministry of Hydraulic
Resources, specific components of such a project may not. It is not
uncommon to see a joint project that involves an Electricity Authority, a Ministry of Agriculture or a Department of Irrigation, and
some other Agency responsible for potable water supply. Quite
often, these agencies take direct responsibility for the separable
components of the projects, even if the joint or common components are being constructed and operated under a unified
authority.
More serious still, the responsibility for ancillary services, such as
agricultural extension, or credit supply, or processing and marketing,
is divided among government agencies who frequently fail to coordinate their efforts to supply the required services and professional
manpower needs in a timely and effective manner. Hence, while the
water resources planning agency may have considered these ancillary
services and assured the availability of the required financial resources, it may not concern itself with the question of whether the
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physical resource and manpower needs can actually be met. This is
the usually jealously guarded responsibility and prerogative of
another agency. As a result, services oftentimes are not forthcoming,
or, if they are provided, they are ineffective because low quality
people are found to fill these positions. With the thrust of many
water resource projects directed at the improvement of the life of the
uneducated, illiterate rural and urban poor, the combination of substandard or non-existent technical services on the one side and the
low absorptive learning capacity of the target population on the
other are the major contributing factors to the disappointing performance of the water resource projects and programs undertaken
throughout the world.
These problems cannot readily be solved. However, recognition of
the underlying causes, and the design of systematic policies can help
to ameliorate them somewhat in the short run, and eliminate them
eventually in the long run. This requires the development of manpower management programs which contain three essential components:
A. An overall assessment of existing and projected manpower
needs and availabilities by sector and job categories (including the
assessment of competing requirements of the private sector);
B. A long-term program for the education and training of those
skill-categories that are clearly found to be in short supply;
C. A priority ranking for all proposed individual projects that
would draw upon skilled manpower pools that are in short supply at
the time of project implementation, together with an evaluation of
the full opportunity costs of these human resources in their best
alternative employment.
In Mexico, in the field of water resource planning, an important
first step in the direction of assessing overall manpower requirements
3 7
and available supplies has been taken by the National Water Plan.
More detailed studies will be required, however, and the implication
for manpower development policies, their time lag, and the need for
systematic institution building should be investigated and spelled out
for decision makers.
These investigations are likely to show:
A. That long lead times will be necessary in many of the more
crucial skill-categories, particularly if the quality, as well as the quantity, of output is to be an important consideration. If such policies
require new educational institutions, 6 to 8 years may be the mini37. See supra note 1, vol. 3, at 15 & 17.
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mum period required to significantly increase the number of successful, well-trained graduates;
B. Cost impacts of training programs on public budgets will be
significant, and long term commitments, exceeding the life expectancy of an individual government, will be required;
C. Many of the water resources programs and projects planned for
implementation in the near future can not realistically expect to
secure the required well-qualified individuals, or will do so only by
hiring them away from other, equally important programs and
projects; as a result, many of the projected benefits of these new
projects are unlikely to materialize in the short run. This realization
should have important consequences for the overall assessment of the
real benefits and costs of these programs.
CONCLUSIONS
Water resource programs and projects in the developing nations of
the world suffer as much from the lack of skilled manpower inputs as
they do from the lack of capital funds. This problem has been aggravated by the fact that these projects are often designed to help the
rural and urban poor, who lack the necessary managerial and technical skills to secure the full benefits of a project without extensive
help and guidance from technical experts. As a result, project outputs and performances frequently run far below expectations, and
far below actual potential. While this has generally been recognized,
the project by project approach is deficient, since it only secures the
funding and potential hiring of the required manpower needs for one
particular project at a time, without assessment of either the actual
availability or the opportunity costs of these inputs. To ameliorate
and ultimately eliminate these problems, systematic manpower development programs are required that will produce a significant, long
term and sustained shift of financial resources into the appropriate
educational sectors.

